

Cloud Computing Security


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Feb 21, 2017


Outline

1 Attacking Hypervisors

Hypervisor Based Isolation




Hypervisor Based Isolation




Hypervisor Protections


- 2 Software Isolation:
 - CPU: Traps to hypervisor (VM Exits), MSR & I/O permissions bitmaps.
 - Memory / MMIO: Hardware page tables, software shadow page tables.
- 3 Devices Isolation:
 - CPU: interrupt remapping
 - Memory: IOMMU, No-DMA ranges




Protecting Memory with HW Assisted Paging




Firmware Rootkit



Firmware rootkit can open a backdoor for an attacker VM to access all other VMs




Hardware Emulation Attack Vectors



Did you know that VMMs emulate virtual devices of other VMMs?

- 1 QEMU and VirtualBox also emulate VMWare virtual SVGA device.



Guest to Host Memory Corruption


- 1 **CVE-2014-3689:** 3 vulnerabilities in the vmware-vga driver in QEMU allows local guest to write to QEMU memory and gain host/hypervisor privileges via unspecified parameters related to rectangle handling.
- 2 **CVE-2014-6588:** Memory corruption in VMSVGAGMRTRANSFER.
- 3 **CVE-2014-6589, CVE-2014-6590:** Memory corruptions in VMSVGAFIFOLOOP.
- 4 **CVE-2015-0427:** Integer overflow → memory corruption in VMSVGAFIFOGETCMDBUFFER
- 5 **CVE-2015-0377:** Writing arbitrary data to upper 32 bits of *IA32_APIC_BASE* MSR causes VMM and host OS to crash on Oracle VirtualBox.
- 6 **CVE-2015-0418, CVE-2014-3646:** VirtualBox and KVM guest crash when executing INVEPT/INVVPID instructions.

Attacking Hypervisors through System Firmware

- 1 Attacking Hypervisors through System Firmware: with OS kernel access.
- 2 System Management Mode (SMM):
 - System Management Mode (SMM) is an Intel mode which has the particularity to be transparent to the Operating System (OS).
 - It is initialized by the firmware during the boot to handle the hardware and the security of the computer.
 - Entering in SMM is made by triggering a particular interruption: the System Management Interrupt (SMI).
 - When an SMI is triggered the processor saves the context, disables interruptions and switches to a different address space called System Management RAM (SMRAM).
 - To return from SMM the RSM (Return from System Management) instruction is used, restoring the previous state.
 - This instruction can only be executed from SMM. All of those mechanisms allow the SMM to be transparent to the OS.
 - SMRAM is a range of DRAM reserved by BIOS SMI handlers. Protected from software and device access.


Pointer Arguments to SMI Handlers

- 1 SMI Handler writes result to a buffer at address passed in RBX.




Pointer Vulnerabilities in SMI Handlers

- 1 Exploit tricks SMI handler to write to an address inside SMRAM.




Exploiting firmware SMI handler to attack VMM



Firmware has to validate pointers

- 1 Firmware SMI handler validates input pointers to ensure they are outside of SMRAM preventing overwrite of SMI code/data



Point SMI handler to overwrite VMM page

- 1 VT state and EPT protections are OFF in SMM (without STM). SMI handler writes to a protected page via supplied pointer.

